Bainbridge on Corporations

Bainbridge on Corporations

Nvidia Take Home Lessons for Boards of Directors (Part 1)

Thinking through the Caremark implications

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Stephen Bainbridge
Nov 17, 2026
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The WSJ reports that former Nvidia CEO deliberately constructed a system to give Chinese companies backdoor access to Nvidia’s most advanced artificial-intelligence chips. In particular:

Records seen by The Wall Street Journal show Megaspeed—the company of the former Nvidia CEO’s onetime mistress, Alice Huang—arranged to send nearly $12 billion worth of top-of-the-line Nvidia chips to companies in China between March 2024 and June 2025. …

The shipment records show orders for several hundred thousand chips, the very ones that the U.S. wanted most to keep out of Chinese hands through export controls, though the records don’t show how much of the hardware was actually delivered or where it originated.

This screengrab from video footage by CTI shows Alice Huang at a restaurant in Taipei with Nvidia’s Jensen Huang, right, last year.

Did Huang’s scheme cause Nvidia to break US law? On the one hand, the WSJ reports that “Huang’s downfall has set off a groundswell in Congress to halt the workarounds that allowed him to get Chinese business,” which suggests that current laws were not broken.

On the other hand, the WSJ also reports:

The U.S. alleges that a co-founder of Super Micro Computer, a longtime Nvidia partner, and others participated in a conspiracy to ship servers to a Southeast Asian company, then onward to China.

But neither SMC nor Nvidia were charged.

As far as I can tell from the news, at least as of today, there is no public evidence that Nvidia or Jensen Huang violated U.S. export controls. Certainly, neither has been charged or formally accused of it.

The thing to watch is whether DOJ’s Megaspeed inquiry widens to cover Nvidia.

Political Risk and Corporate Governance

Also in the WSJ, Mary Kissel—a political risk consultant—opined:

The case lays bare an Achilles’ heel that Beijing often exploits: the limited perspective of corporate boards.

American executives are trained in capital allocation, personnel management, risk mitigation and technological innovation, with skills that have made our companies the envy of the world. …

Yet few directors of major American companies have experience assessing political risk and the nature of regimes like communist China’s. They don’t learn it at business school or law school. Many directors have never worked or lived in a hostile environment like China’s, where there is no rule of law, property rights, independent boards or expectation of privacy. If they think about geopolitical risk, it’s often through the lens of regulatory risk, such as compliance with the 1977 U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

She concludes by noting that “corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to understand major business risks, mitigate them and disclose significant efforts to shareholders,” although she does not suggest that Nvidia’s board has violated that duty. To the contrary, she opines that the “board’s decision to initiate an investigation is a good first step.”

The Potential Legal Fallout

A Brief Caremark Backgrounder

Famed corporate lawyer Bayless Manning once observed that most of what boards do “does not consist of taking affirmative action on individual matters” but rather of “a continuing flow of supervisory process, punctuated only occasionally by a discrete transactional decision.”1

It has long been settled that the duty of care requires directors to pay on-going attention to the business and affairs of the corporation. Directors are not expected to know, in minute detail, everything that happens on a day-to-day basis. Instead, a director is expected to have a rudimentary understanding of the firm’s business and how it works, keep informed about the firm’s activities, engage in a general monitoring of corporate affairs, attend board meetings regularly, and routinely review financial statements.2 Beyond these obligations, however, do boards have an obligation to monitor proactively the conduct of corporate subordinates?

In Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig.,3 Delaware Chancellor Allen opined that a board of directors in fact has an obligation proactively to take affirmative compliance measures:

[I]t would, in my opinion, be a mistake to conclude that our Supreme Court’s statement in Graham concerning “espionage” means that corporate boards may satisfy their obligation to be reasonably informed concerning the corporation, without assuring themselves that information and reporting systems exist in the organization that are reasonably designed to provide to senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to allow management and the board, each within its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law and its business performance. . . .

Thus, I am of the view that a director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards.

In Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court confirmed that “Caremark articulates the necessary conditions for assessing director oversight liability.”

Subsequent cases have suggested that there are two principal theories of liability under Caremark:

  • Prong One Caremark claims arise when the board of directors "utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls" to monitor key legal and regulatory compliance risks.

    • I don’t see any serious risk of a viable Prong One claim here. Nvidia has an export-compliance program. As long as the program included reporting to the board, Prong One should be deemed satisfied.

      • Having said that Nvidia today announced that “the Board of Directors has established the National Security and Export Control Oversight Committee, a new standing committee responsible for board-level oversight of the company’s national security policies, export control compliance and global trade risk management. NVIDIA’s existing National Security Team and Global Trade Compliance Team will report directly to the Committee and to Interim CEO, Colette Kress, on day-to-day operations.” So I am sure potential plaintiff counsel will look into the preexisting structure for a possible Prong One claim.

  • Prong Two Caremark claims arise when the board of directors did implement a compliance and reporting system, but "consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention."

    • To make out a so-called Caremark prong two claim, plaintiffs must show directors “consciously failed to monitor or oversee [the system’s] operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.” This requires pleading that directors “were conscious of the fact that they were not doing their jobs” and ignored “red flags” indicating misconduct.

I should also note a Caremark-adjacent doctrine known as a Massey claim, which arises when a board of directors intentionally caused or permitted the corporation to violate state or federal law.4

FYI

The foregoing discussion is drawn from my book, Corporate Law: Concepts and Insights (Foundation Press 2025) (AMAZON LINK).

For additional background see my posts:

Caremark Week: Teligent's Collapse (Part One)

Caremark Week: Teligent's Collapse (Part One)

Stephen Bainbridge
·
Feb 9
Read full story
Caremark Week: Teligent's Collapse (Part Two)

Caremark Week: Teligent's Collapse (Part Two)

Stephen Bainbridge
·
Feb 11
Read full story

Possible Caremark-Based Claims Against Nvidia’s Board of Directors

As I see it, there are several potential situations in which Prong Two claims that could lie against Nvidia’s board:

  1. Nvidia is found to have violated US law and is forced to pay significant fines or settlements.

  2. Nvidia suffers significant regulatory backlash that makes it much more difficult for Nvidia to sell chips overseas, which results in a major hit to its revenue stream.

  3. Nvidia suffers significant reputational damage, which allows competitors to capture market share and results in a major hit to its revenue stream.

So, how much should Nvidia directors be worrying?

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